Associationism
has been a cornerstone of our view of memory and conceptual understanding
for a very long time. It was a key element for the British empirical
philosophers of the 16th century (Locke, Hume, Berkeley, James Mill.;
and John Stuart Mill.S.;) and was also central to much of the work of
the learning theorists who dominated experimental psychology in the
first half of this century. The
central concept is very simple: when two elements are experienced as
occurring together in time (contiguously) they will become associated
in memory. Recent models of semantic memory have had a strong
associative component and have even been described as being "neo-associationist"
(Anderson and Bower,
1973). In these models, long-term memory is depicted as a 'network'
of countless associations between verbal and conceptual entities, and
memory retrieval becomes a search through this maze of pathways.
However, such theories differ
radically from the original associationist views in terms of complexity.
A variety of new features have been incorporated and these include logical
relations between elements, hierarchical structures, and a new stress
on context and strategy (see, for example, Collins
and Quillian, 1969; Anderson
and Bower, 1973; Collins
and Loftus, 1975; Rumelhart
and Ortony, 1977; Norman,
Gentner and Stevens, 1976).
Of primary importance has
been the incorporation of subordinate
and superordinate
relations between semantic categories (Collins
and Quillian, 1969), since this led to the inclusion of logical
inference in models of memory.
Figure 11 depicts a simple but plausible semantic
network centred on the concept bitter in which
length of line is negatively correlated with strength of association,
i.e., the shorter the
line, the stronger the association. A number of limitations are
clearly illustrated by even a cursory examination.